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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Daniel George Johnston appeals from his conviction for failure to register
as a sex offender.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The

Bonneville County Sherriff's Office received

information from

Michigan that Johnston, a "non-compliant and absconded Sex Offender," was
living in that county. (R., p. 15.) The information from Michigan indicated that
Johnston has a lifetime registration requirement based on prior convictions in
Michigan.

(Id.)

The state charged Johnston with failure to register as a sex

offender, asserting that he was required to register as the result of a 1990
Michigan conviction for First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct.

(R., pp. 26-27,

65-66.)
Johnston filed a motion to dismiss, claiming he had no duty to register as
a sex offender in Idaho. (R., pp. 96-110.) One of the arguments made was that
"no official determination has been made ... that the Michigan convictions alleged
by the State are substantially similar to any Idaho crime specifically set forth in
the statute."

(R., p. 105.)

The district court held a hearing at which it took

argument, but no evidence. (2/10/14 Tr., p. 3, L. 1 - p. 21, L. 25; R., pp. 70-71.)
The district court then denied the motion. (2/10/14 Tr., p. 22, L. 1 - p. 29, L. 1;
R., pp. 70-71.) The district court determined that the Michigan conviction was for

an offense substantially equivalent to Idaho sex offenses requiring registration,
specifically lewd conduct with a child under the age of 16 and rape. (2/10/14 Tr.,

1

28, Ls. 3-24 )
appeal

Thereafter Johnston entered a guilty plea, preserving his right
motion

(R.,

district

court sentenced Johnston to seven years with two years determinate, suspended
with probation, and entered judgment, from which Johnston timely appealed. (R.,
pp. 113-25.)

2

ISSUES
issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Johnston's motion
dismiss?

2.

Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction to
convict Mr. Johnston?

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Is Johnston's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction, raised for
the first time on appeal, meritless?

2.

Has Johnston failed to show error in the district court's ruling that the
Michigan First Degree Sexual Conduct statute defined a crime
substantially equivalent to an Idaho offense requiring registration as a sex
offender?

3

ARGUMENT

I.
Johnston's Claim That The Amendment Of The Information Deprived The District
Court Of Jurisdiction Is Without Merit
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Johnston claims the district court lacked

jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-23.) Specifically,
he claims that an amendment to the information deprived the district court of
jurisdiction.

(Appellant's brief, p. 15.) Review of the procedural history of this

case and application of the law to the facts shows this argument is meritless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at

any time and is subject to de novo review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757,
101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). Whether a particular crime is considered an included
offense is also a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 261 P.3d 519, 521 (2011 ).

C.

The Amendment To The Information Did Not Deprive The District Court Of
Its Previously Vested Jurisdiction
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general

type or class of dispute." State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255,
1258 (2011) (internal quotes omitted).

Idaho courts have "subject matter

jurisdiction over a crime if any essential element of the crime, including the result,
occurs within Idaho." State v. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 914, 828 P.2d 1316, 1319
(1992).

"The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was

4

committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the
State v. Rogers, 1

Idaho

228, 91

11

11

invalid charging document does not confer subject matter jurisdiction. Lute, 150
Idaho at 840-41, 252 P.3d at 1258-59.
The state's criminal complaint set forth several statutes the state alleged
Johnston had violated, including both I.C. §§ 18-8309 and 18-8307. (R., pp. 1011.) After a preliminary hearing the magistrate found probable cause to believe
Johnston had been in the state since 2005 and had complied with none of the
registration requirements. (4/05/13 Tr., p. 53, L. 1 - p. 54, L. 2; R., p. 23.) The
state filed an information charging Johnston with failure to "register change of
address or name" pursuant to I.C. § 18-8309.

(R., pp. 26-27 (capitalization

altered).) The facts alleged in the information were as follows:
The Defendant, DANIEL GEORGE JOHNSTON, convicted as a
sex offender on January 17, 1990, for the charge of Criminal
Sexual Conduct 1st Degree and May 17, 1989, for the charge of
Attempted Criminal Sexual Conduct 4th Degree, and residing in the
State of Idaho, on or between 2008 and 2013, in the County of
Bonneville, State of Idaho, did wrongfully fail to inform the law
enforcement agency with whom DANIEL GEORGE JOHNSTON
last registered, of his change of address, in writing, within two (2)
days of such change.
(Id.) The state later filed a motion to amend the information to charge "failure to
register" under I.C. § 18-8307, "for the reason that the statue [sic] better reflects
the evidence of the crime." (R., p. 60 (capitalization altered).) Johnston did not
object to the motion, the district court granted it, and the state filed an amended
information. (R., pp. 63, 65-66.) The facts alleged in the amended information
were as follows:

5

The Defendant, DANIEL GEORGE JOHNSTON, between 2008
and 2013, in the State of Idaho, failed to register with the sheriff of
the county in which the defendant resided or was temporarily
domiciled, within two (2) working days of coming into that county
and did fail to register annually, and the Defendant was at that time
required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act as a
result of his January, 1990 conviction for First Degree Criminal
Sexual Conduct in Michigan.
(Id.)
The record in this case thus shows that the state's complaint alleged a
violation of both I.C. § 18-8309 (failure to register a change of address) and I.C.
§18-8307 (failure to register), and the magistrate found probable cause to believe
that Johnston had complied with none of his registration requirements. 1 The
state's first information included only the I.C. § 18-8309 (failure to register a
change of address) violation, and the amended information included only the I.C.
§ 18-8307 (failure to register) violation.
The

Idaho

Supreme

Court

has

declared

a

charging

document

jurisdictionally invalid under two circumstances. First, if the grand jury returns an
information after its term has expired.

Lute, 150 Idaho at 840-41, 252 P. 3d at

1258-59 ("where a grand jury does not have a legally recognized existence, any
indictments that a grand jury returns are invalid"). Second, where the defendant
was acquitted of the charged offense at trial and the district court allowed a postacquittal amendment to a non-included offense. State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525,

Johnston complains that factual allegations in the complaint did not support a
charge under both I.C. §§ 18-8309 and 18-8307 (Appellant's brief, p. 17, n.7), but
such is not a jurisdictional claim. State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 621-22, 115
P.3d 710, 712-13 (2005) (failure to allege facts sufficient to support conviction not
jurisdictional defect).
1

6

261 P.3d 519, 520 (2011 ). 2 The Idaho Supreme Court has never held that a

a non-included offense
document.
Consistent with this existing precedent, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
held that a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over an improperly included
offense. In State v. Herrera, 149 Idaho 216, 218, 233 P.3d 147, 149 (2009), the
state charged Herrera and his co-defendant with conspiracy to traffic in heroin
and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. For the first time on appeal Herrera claimed
the district court erroneously instructed the jury it could consider delivery of
cocaine as an included offense of conspiracy to deliver cocaine.
P.3d at 152.

~

at 221, 233

The Court concluded Herrera's argument that the error was

jurisdictional was "without merit":
The district court acquired subject matter jurisdiction in the
defendants' case upon the filing of the indictment. State v. Jones,
140 Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 701-02 (2004). Even if an
improper lesser included offense instruction was given, the court's
subject matter jurisdiction that was conferred via the indictment
remained throughout the trial, for subject matter jurisdiction does
not depend upon the correctness of any decision made by the
court. [State v.J Rogers, 140 Idaho [223,J 228, 91 P.3d [1127,]
1132 [(2004)].
Accordingly, the defendants' challenge to the
delivery instruction, raised for the first time on this appeal, will not
be considered by this Court.

kt at 221-222, 233 P.3d at 152-153.

2

The Idaho Court of Appeals has applied Flegel more broadly than its facts and
held that a pre-trial amendment to a non-included offense, agreed to by the
defendant, rendered the charging document invalid. State v. Schmeirer, _
Idaho_, _
P.3d _ , 2014 WL 6652924 (Ct. App. 2014), petition for review
granted.
7

"Johnston

asserts that the Amended

it charged a

Information failed

crime than the

impart

charged in

original Information." (Appellant's brief, p. 20.) He relies on State v. Flegel, 151
Idaho 525, 526, 261 P.3d 519, 520 (2011), to support this claim.
brief, pp. 21-22.)

(Appellant's

Review of the Flegel opinion shows it does not support his

claim.
In Flegel the defendant was acquitted, after a trial, of the charged crime of
lewd conduct.

Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526, 261 P.3d at 520.

Sexual abuse had

also been submitted to the jury as an included offense, and the jury hung on that
crime.

kl

After trial the prosecutor amended the charge from lewd conduct to

sexual abuse without resubmission to a grand jury. kt_ "Because Sexual Abuse
is not a lesser included offense of Lewd Conduct, Flegel could only be validly
charged by indictment with that crime if the matter was resubmitted to the grand
jury and it returned the amended indictment."

kl

Unlike in Herrera, where the properly brought conspiracy charge was still
unresolved, the district court in Flegel did not enjoy continuing jurisdiction.
Rather, the acquittal on the only valid charge ended the court's jurisdiction. There
was simply no charging document left to amend because the sexual abuse
charge was not an included offense.

The charging document was rendered

invalid not by any error of the court or prosecutor, but because of the acquittal.
This case is like Herrera in that there was no ending of jurisdiction. There
is no doubt that the district court had jurisdiction at the time it ruled on the motion
to amend.

Thus any error in amending the charge was simply error, not a

8

jurisdictional invalidation of the charging document.

1

53

Herrera, 149

State v. Rogers, 1

228, 9

3d 1127, 1132 (2004)).
In addition, the record in this case shows that the amendment was to
allege a charge included in the complaint and on which the magistrate found
probable cause. Johnston has presented no theory under which the district court
would have been deprived of jurisdiction if the state's original information had
charged I.C. §18-8307 (failure to register) instead of or in addition to I.C. § 188309 (failure to register a change of address). Because the district court would
have had jurisdiction over the charge had it been brought in the original
information, there is no reasonable view of the law that would deprive the district
court of jurisdiction merely because the charge was not included until the filing of
the amended information.
The amended information alleged a crime in the state of Idaho.
therefore alleged every jurisdictional prerequisite.

It

Johnston's belief that it was

somehow improperly amended does not show a lack of jurisdiction.

11.
Johnston Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Ruling That The
Michigan First Degree Sexual Conduct Statute Defined A Crime Substantially
Equivalent To An Idaho Offense Requiring Registration As A Sex Offender
A.

Introduction
The district court determined that Johnston's Michigan conviction for First

Degree Sexual Conduct was substantially equivalent to the Idaho crimes of lewd
and lascivious conduct and rape. (2/10/14 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 3-24.) Johnston makes

9

several arguments why he believes this was error (Appellant's brief,

6-15),

arguments are

Standard Of Review
Whether a foreign conviction is under a statute "substantially equivalent"
to an Idaho statute is a question of law given free review.

See State v.

Dickerson, 142 Idaho 514, 517, 129 P.3d 1263, 1266 (Ct. App. 2006).

C.

First Degree Sexual Conduct Is The Substantial Equivalent Of Idaho
Crimes Requiring Sex Offender Registration
The Sex Offender Registration Act applies to any person "convicted of any

crime . . . in another jurisdiction ... that is substantially equivalent" to the Idaho
offenses requiring registration. I.C. § 18-8304(b). 3 The Idaho offenses requiring
registration include lewd conduct with a child, I.C. § 18-1508, and rape, I.C. § 186101 (excluding subsection (1) "where the defendant is 18 years of age"). 1.C. §
18-8304(1 ). Lewd conduct with a child is committed by performing "any lewd or
lascivious act" on a child under 16, including genital to genital contact. I.C. § 181508.

Rape includes the sexual penetration of a female under the age of 16.

I.C. § 18-6101 (1 ).

The Michigan crime at issue was committed by "sexual

penetration" of a "person under 13 years of age."
750b(1 )(a).

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §

Even a cursory comparison shows that the Michigan offense was

"substantially equivalent" to crimes requiring sexual registration under Idaho law.

This subsection was amended in 2013 in a manner that does not affect the
analysis. 2013 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 240, § 3, p. 566 .
3

. 10

Johnston first argues that the state "failed to prove Mr. Johnston was
requ

register in Michigan." (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) Although it is

that the state did not prove this requirement at the hearing on the motion to
dismiss, Johnston's argument is irrelevant because the state had no duty to
prove its case at that point. That is what trials are for. At the hearing on the
motion to dismiss neither side presented evidence. Rather, Johnston argued that
he did not have a duty to register in Michigan (2/10/14 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 17-18), and
the prosecutor argued that the state had no duty to present evidence, and made
an offer of proof that Johnston had admitted to the police that he was required to
register in Michigan, Indiana, and Idaho. (2/10/14 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 10-25.4 )
Johnston's argument that the state failed to prove his guilt in response to a
motion to dismiss is frivolous.
Johnston next argues that the state failed to prove what subsection of the
Michigan statute he was convicted under. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12.) Again,
Johnston appears to be under the misapprehension that the state had the burden
to prove his guilt at the motion hearing. To the contrary, Johnston waived his
right to have the state prove his guilt when he entered a guilty plea. Because
Johnston has presented no law indicating that the state had any burden of
producing evidence or proving elements of the crime to defeat his motion to
dismiss, his argument fails. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,

This evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing. (4/05/13 Tr., p. 8, L. 9
- p. 12, L. 6.) Johnston's motion to dismiss did not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence to establish probable cause. (R., pp. 96-110.)
4

11

970 (1996) (Court will disregard arguments unsupported by citation to legal
authority).
Johnston's arguments rely upon his underlying false assumption that the
state had to prove his guilt at the hearing on his motion to dismiss. This renders
his arguments frivolous. He has failed to show that the district court erred when
it concluded that Johnston's Michigan conviction for First Degree Sexual Conduct
was substantially equivalent to offenses requiring registration in Idaho.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
judgment.
DATED this 27th day of October,

KENNETH K. JORRE \ s
Deputy Attorney Genera

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of October, 2015, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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